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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(d) (Supp. 1990) and Rule 26(2)(a), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure (1990) whereby a defendant may take an appeal to 
the Court of Appeals from a final judgment and conviction. In this 
case final judgment and conviction was rendered by the Honorable 
Paul G. Grant, Judge, Third Circuit Court, Third Circuit Court, in 
and for Salt Lake City, State of Utah. 
- iii -
TEXTS OF STATUTESy RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Rule 609(a), Utah Rules of Evidence (1990) provides in part: 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the 
credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a 
crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by 
public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the 
law which he was convicted, and the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial 
effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false 
statement, regardless of the punishment. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in denying 
Mr. Holtman's motion to suppress his prior conviction? 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
GLENN E. HOLTMAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 900177-CA 
Priority #2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Honorable 
Paul G. Grant, Third Circuit Court, in and for Salt Lake City, State 
of Utah. A jury found Mr. Holtman guilty of Retail Theft, a class B 
Misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City Ordinances, § 11.36.060 
after a trial held on January 24, 1990. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 28, 1989, Mr. Holtman and his brother Jason were 
browsing in Nordstrom's Department Store (R. 28). Mr. Holtman, the 
defendant, walked up to the sunglasses counter and asked to try on 
several pair of sunglasses (R. 29). He tried on the pairs putting 
his own sunglasses on the counter with the other sunglasses (R. 
30). After walking back and forth to a mirror several times he 
reboxed the sunglasses, waited to return them to the sales person, 
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and then left with his brother (R. 31). He put what he thought were 
his sunglasses on his head and walked out of the store at which 
point he was arrested (R. 31). 
At trial, immediately before Mr. Holtman, the defendant, 
took the stand, counsel for defendant made a motion under Rule 
609(a)(1) and (2) to exclude evidence of the defendant's prior 
conviction for grand larceny in Virginia. The motion was denied 
primarily because, as the trial court noted, the crimes were so 
similar in nature that the prior conviction was probative on the 
issue of intent and would aid the jury in judging the defendant's 
credibility. (R. 24). Counsel for the City indicated originally 
that she would only ask if there had been a prior felony conviction 
should the defendant take the stand (R. 23). After the motion was 
denied counsel for the defense asked the counsel for the City what 
she was going to ask on cross-examination concerning the prior 
conviction (R. 25). Her response was that she would ask if the 
defendant had ever been convicted of a felony and, if so, what the 
crime was and when it was committed (R. 25, inaudible response 
reconstructed by stipulation between counsel). Defense counsel 
elicited this information on direct examination of Mr. Holtman (R. 
32). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in denying Mr. Holtman's motion to 
suppress his conviction for grand larceny pursuant to Rule 609, Utah 
Rules of Evidence. The probative value of the conviction did not 
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outweigh its prejudicial effect; furthermore, the conviction was not 
for a crime of dishonesty or false statement within the meaning of 
subsection 2 of Rule 609(a). Such error was reversible, since it 
was most likely used by the jury as evidence of Mr, Holtman's intent 
to steal, the only issue at trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
MR. HOLTMAN'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF 
HIS PRIOR CONVICTION. 
At trial defense counsel moved to suppress Mr. Holtman's 
prior conviction pursuant to Rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence (R. 
21-25). Mr. Holtman's prior conviction which the state would have 
used for impeachment purposes consisted of a 1988 conviction in 
Virginia for Grand Larceny (R. 32, inaudible portion agreed to by 
stipulation). The trial court denied the motion (R. 23-24). 
Because of the trial court's ruling, defense counsel elicited from 
the defendant on direct examination that he had been convicted of 
grand larceny in Virginia (R. 32, inaudible portion agreed to by 
stipulation). 
A. The prior conviction was not admissible 
under 609(a)(1). 
Rule 609(a)(1) provides: 
For the purpose of attacking the credibility 
of a witness, evidence that he has been 
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if 
elicited from him or established by public 
record during cross-examination but only if 
the crime (1) was punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year under the 
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law which he was convicted, and the court 
determines that the probative value of 
admitting the evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial effect to the defendant [.] 
The Utah Supreme Court has summarized the factors to be considered 
in balancing probative value against prejudicial effect as follows: 
[1] the nature of the crime, as bearing on 
the veracity of the witness . . . . 
[2] the recentness or remoteness of the 
prior conviction . . . . 
[3] the similarity of the prior crime to 
the charged crime, insofar as a close 
resemblance may lead the jury to punish the 
accused as a bad person . . . . 
[4] the importance of credibility issues in 
determining the truth in a prosecution tried 
without decisive nontestimonial evidence . . 
[5] the importance of the accused's 
testimony, as perhaps warranting the 
exclusion of convictions, probative of the 
accused's character for veracity . . . . 
State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1334 (Utah 1986)(citations omitted). 
The burden of proving that the probative value of the 
conviction, in that its admission tells something about defendant's 
credibility, outweighs the prejudicial effect of its admission is on 
the prosecution. Banner at 1334. In the present case the City 
offered no evidence or explanation as to how the prior conviction 
was probative of Mr. Holtman's character for truth and veracity (R. 
22-23). In looking at the factors outlined by the Banner Court, 
three out of five weigh heavily in favor of suppressing the 
conviction. 
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Mr. Holtman was on trial for a retail theft, the prior 
felony conviction was for grand larceny, a theft crime. This 
similarity could have caused the jury to do just what the trial 
court suggested it was proper for the jury to do, that is the jury 
could have used the fact of a prior theft to decide whether or not 
Mr. Holtman had intended to steal the glasses or merely walked out 
thinking he had his own glasses with him. Mr. Holtman's defense was 
that he made an innocent mistake. By allowing the jury to hear 
evidence of a prior felony theft, the jury had less incentive to 
evaluate whether or not Mr. Holtman's actions in this case were 
innocent. The Banner Court's concern with punishment of the accused 
I 
because of prior crimes is implicated here. 
In addition to factor [3] weighing on the side of 
suppression, factors [4] and [5] do, too. There was no decisive 
nontestimonial evidence. Mr. Holtman's actions were not contested, 
only his intentions. Credibility of the witnesses was critical to 
the jury's determination. Two security guards testified for the 
City that Mr. Holtman's actions were suspicious and that he 
evidenced behavior proving he was trying to steal the sunglasses. 
Mr. Holtman's brother testified to some collateral matters. 
Mr. Holtman alone testified to his innocent intentions and confusion 
in trying on the sunglasses. Therefore, Mr. Holtman's testimony was 
essential to make out his defense. His own credibility with the 
jury was the only evidence they could rely on to determine whose 
perceptions were correct. 
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Factor number [2] perhaps weighs in favor of admissions, 
but by itself recentness or remoteness is the least important of the 
factors. Factor number [1] is the most problematic. If this factor 
involves the same evaluation as used under 609(a)(2), than, as 
argued below, a theft crime without more information is not 
probative of veracity. However, if there is a lower threshold to be 
applied here, a theft crime might be probative of veracity. 
However, because this trial is for a theft crime, credibility is at 
issue, and it is necessary for the defendant to testify, even if a 
theft crime might be probative, its prejudicial effect outweighs any 
marginally probative value it might have. 
Finally, the trial court's ruling indicates that the 
conviction is admissible for substantive reasons. The court's 
analysis is that the prior conviction is probative of the 
defendant's intent. This is inappropriate, but probably indicates 
exactly how the jury used the evidence of Mr. Holtman's prior 
conviction. 
The trial court's denial of Mr. Holtman's motion to 
suppress his prior conviction was error under 609(a)(1). 
B. The prior conviction was not admissible 
under 609(a)(2). 
Rule 609(a)(2) provides: 
For the purpose of attacking the credibility 
of a witness, evidence that he has been 
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if 
elicited from him or established by public 
record during cross-examination but only if 
the crime . . . (2) involved dishonesty or 
false statement, regardless of punishment. 
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Theft crimes are not necessarily crimes of dishonesty or false 
statement, unless there is an element of fraud or deceit involved 
that "bearfs] directly on the likelihood that the defendant will 
testify truthfully." State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 656 (Utah 1989) 
(citations omitted). Under 609(a)(2) Utah courts have found 
inadmissible prior convictions for robbery and burglary, 
State v. Lanier, 778 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah 1989); retail theft and 
attempted burglary, Bruce at 656; misdemeanor theft, State v. Brown, 
771 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Utah App. 1989); aggravated robbery, 
State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 18 (Utah App. 1988). 
The City once again had the burden of showing Mr. Holtman's 
prior conviction for grand larceny involved deceit or dishonesty. 
Brown at 1094. In addition, the trial court must inquire into the 
underlying facts before a conviction is admissible under 609(a)(2). 
Brown at 1094; Wight at 18. Neither did the City provide 
information or the underlying facts, nor did the trial court 
investigate further than defense counsel's proffer that Mr. Holtman 
merely carried keys in a car theft scheme and never made any 
representations to any victims indicating a tendency to lie. (R. 22). 
Mr. Holtman's prior conviction is a theft crime; however, 
there is no evidence in the record of any fraud or deceit on the 
defendant's part. The trial court's denial of Mr. Holtman's motion 
to suppress his prior conviction was error under 609(a)(2). 
C. The refusal to suppress admission of the 
prior conviction was prejudicial error. 
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[T]he standard for error in cases involving 
a wrongful failure to exclude prior 
convictions is whether "there was 'a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
result for the defendant.1" 
State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1038 (Utah 1987) (citations 
omitted). The Utah Supreme Court has found prejudicial error in 
circumstances where the prior conviction was admitted, and 
[t]he evidence of the defendant's guilt . . . 
was far from overwhelming. 
State v. Lanier, 778 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah 1989). 
In the present case the only issue was Mr. Holtman's intent 
to steal the sunglasses. The evidence against him consisted of two 
witnesses who described his behavior as suspicious (R. 4 & 15). His 
own testimony was that he had made on honest mistake and picked up 
the wrong sunglasses before he left (R. 31-32). Mr. Holtman's 
testimony was completely negated by the trial courts denial of 
defendant's motion to suppress his prior theft conviction. The jury 
heard that Mr. Holtman had been convicted of felony theft no more 
than one year earlier. His credibility was reduced in the jury's 
eyes by a fact that has very little to do with credibility. The 
jury should have been allowed to deliberate in this case without the 
distraction the prior conviction created. Mr. Holtman's actions at 
the time of the alleged retail theft should have been left to speak 
for themselves through the testimony of the witnesses for the City 
and through Mr. Holtman himself. He should have been judged not as 
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an ex-felon engaged in suspicious behavior and therefore found 
guilty, but as a young man acting as he did one day in Nordstroms. 
The denial of the motion to suppress was prejudicial error. 
CONCLUSION 
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant, 
Glen E. Holtman, respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction and remand the case to the Circuit Court for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /Q ^ day of August, 1990. 
RT L. STEELE 
rney for Defendant/Appellant 
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